TTP EXTENSION · AUTHORITY CURRENTNESS
Authority Head Anti-Rollback Rule
Authenticity is not recency. A verifier must bind an authenticated authority head to monotonic trusted history before using that head to fence a consequential decision.
AUTHENTIC HEAD ≠ LATEST HEAD.
Decision rule
RECEIVE AUTHORITY HEAD H
↓
AUTHENTICATE H
↓
READ TRUSTED HIGH-WATERMARK G*
↓
H.generation >= G* ?
├─ no → authority_head_rollback_detected → HOLD
└─ yes
↓
ADVANCE G* MONOTONICALLY
↓
VERIFY AUTHORITY VIEW CURRENTNESS
↓
VERIFY RULE / PROOF / SCOPE
↓
CURRENT OWNER ADOPTS
↓
FENCED COMMIT
↓
PROVE AUTHENTICITY → ANTI-ROLLBACK → VIEW → PROOF → EFFECTWhy the signature is not enough
A signature or MAC can prove that an authority issued a statement and that its bytes were not modified. It cannot prove that no newer authentic statement has appeared since.
I87–I90
- I87 — Authentic head ≠ latest head.
- I88 — Currentness must bind to monotonic anti-rollback state or an equivalent trusted checkpoint.
- I89 — An authentic head below the trusted high-watermark must fail closed before consequence.
- I90 — Anti-rollback state must survive verifier restart or be reconstructed from trusted witness/checkpoint evidence.
Recovery
checkpoint missing / conflicting / lower than trusted history
→ CURRENTNESS UNKNOWN
→ HOLD
→ reconstruct / reconcile trusted history
→ do not choose the permissive headEvidence requirement
Preserve head identity, authenticated payload, generation, prior accepted high-watermark, checkpoint update, authority-view state, proof binding, execution authority and the resulting effect in one inspectable trajectory.
Boundary
Verified #032 uses deterministic HMAC and a verifier-local PostgreSQL high-watermark. Production systems may use independent witnesses, transparency checkpoints, quorum/consensus or hardware-backed monotonic state. A durable local checkpoint that can itself be rolled back by storage restore is a separate trust problem.