TTP EXTENSION · MEMBERSHIP AUTHORITY CURRENTNESS
Authentic membership is not enough. Authority history must not move backward.
A witness-membership record may remain perfectly authentic after a successor configuration takes over. The verifier therefore needs monotonic evidence of which membership epoch it has already trusted.
AUTHENTIC MEMBERSHIP RECORD ≠ CURRENT MEMBERSHIP AUTHORITY.
Decision rule
RECEIVE MEMBERSHIP M + QUORUM QC
↓
AUTHENTICATE M
↓
READ TRUSTED MEMBERSHIP CHECKPOINT C
↓
M.epoch < C.epoch?
├─ yes → membership_authority_rollback_detected
│ → HOLD / 0 CONSEQUENCE
└─ no
↓
M.epoch == C.epoch?
├─ yes → REQUIRE SAME SET ID + DIGEST + THRESHOLD
└─ no → REQUIRE AUTHENTIC FORWARD LINEAGE
BEFORE ADVANCING C
↓
VALIDATE QC AGAINST CURRENT M
↓
CHECK QUORUM CONSISTENCY
↓
CHECK AUTHORITY HEAD / VIEW / PROOF
↓
FENCED CONSEQUENCERequired bindings
- membership namespace;
- witness-set identity;
- monotonic set epoch;
- membership digest;
- exact member identities;
- threshold policy;
- predecessor / successor lineage evidence;
- issuance generation when relevant.
I107–I110
- I107 — Authentic membership record ≠ current membership authority.
- I108 — Membership currentness must bind to a monotonic set-epoch / membership-digest checkpoint or equivalent anti-rollback evidence.
- I109 — Authentic membership below the trusted membership high-watermark must fail closed before consequence.
- I110 — Fresh current-membership quorum evidence is required to restore live authority after rotation.
Failure disposition
membership_authority_rollback_detected
→ preserve trusted high-watermark
→ no adoption
→ no external effect
→ resolve current membership
→ require current-set quorum evidenceBoundary
This rule does not define production membership governance, PKI, BFT reconfiguration, transparency logs or distributed checkpoint witnesses. It defines the narrower safety invariant: membership authenticity must be combined with monotonic currentness evidence.